TOP-SECRET
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Paul Middleton

COMMANDER ASSAULT FORCE 'O' WESTER NAVAL TASK FORCE PERATION PLAN nertune peration Plan Neptune Part Three

The story of Short Title: SS Empire Anvil

TOP SECRET - OPERATION PLAN NEPTUNE PART THREE

Published by Paul Middleton

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FACTS ABOUT THIS BOOK

This Part Three contains facsimiles of 58 pages
Annex E Gunfire Support Plan
Annex F Smoke Plane
Annex G Air Plan

The copy of Operation Plan Neptune contains 247 pages of typewritten text. The fore-edge is punched at the top and bottom and fits on to two thick metal prongs which are fixed to a thick black, coated cardboard cover. The back cover is missing.

All the pages are brittle and faded with age.

The Plan was in the possession of Marcus Jefferson Geerts,

1st Mate on the SS Empire Anvil and passed into the Geerts' Family Archives.

For details of his career and SS Empire Anvil, see the end of the book.

FOREWORD

OPERATION NEPTUNE was the naval Channel crossing phase of Operation Overlord, the code-name given to the Allied invasion of France. An armada of 4,000 vessels transported the Allied invasion forces to Normandy Beach on D-day, June 6, 1944, and the *SS Empire Anvil* was part of that armada.

Admiral Bertram Ramsay, the Allied naval commander in chief, signed the orders for Operation Neptune, calling it "probably the largest and most complicated operation ever undertaken". Ramsay also wrote that "the object of Operation Neptune is to carry out an operation from the United Kingdom to secure a lodgement on the continent from which further offensive operations can be developed".

Admiral Ramsey's plan assumed the huge aerial power of the Allies would nullify any German attack from the air. His armada therefore would be headed by 287 mine sweepers to clear the way for the 138 warships to follow. These would bombard the German beach defences. The convoy of 4,000 troop carriers would then sail from southern English ports protected by frigates and corvettes.

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
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OPERATION NEPTUNE ORDER No. BB-44
WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE
ASSAULT FORCE "O" (TASK FORCE ONE TWO FOUR)
U.S.S. ANCON, FLAGSHIP PORTLAND DORSET
20 May 1944 1200

Chapter 1 Annex E Gunfire Support Plan



Annex E Gunfire Support Plan: Fire Support Groups 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Western naval task force assault force "o" 11thPHIB/A4-3(1)(a) Serial: 00681 (TASK FORCE ONE TWO FOUR) TOP SECRET - NEPTUTE U.S.S. ANCON, Flagship, PORTIAND, DORSET, 20 May 1944; 1200. TO OPERATION ORDER BB-AA OUNFIRE SUPPORT PLAN Fire Support Group SIX - M. 16 Accidented (61) LCS(S) - from CHASE (1), HEMERICO (1) LST374(4), ISY376(3), LST6(3) (62) LCS(S) - from CARROLL (1), JEFFERSON (1) LST315(3), LST310(3), LST317(3), LST375(1) (1) 12 LCS(S)s 12 LCS(S)s (a) Known Coast defenses are described in NEPTUNE Monograph, listed in Appendix 2, List of Targets and indicated on the Shore Line (b) For purposes of counterbattery fire the beach and areas inland thereof are divided into Sectors of Responsibility corresponding to the 29th and 1st Division Areas as follows: SECTOR I - From the line 500963 - A40875 east to the line 676906 - 656883 - 624848 SECTOR II- From Sector I east to the line 748884 -745852 - 761817 (c) Shore Fire Control Parties will be provided by the Landing Force as follows: Approximate landing time Ferce "O" SFCP 1 2nd Ranger Bn SFCP 2 5th Ranger Bn SFGP 3,4,5 1,2,3, Bns 116th Reg. Combat Team H/30,H/30,H/57 SFGP 7,8,9 1,2,3, Bns 16th Reg. Combat Team H/70,H/30,H/30 SFGP 11,12,13 1,2,3, Bns 18th Reg. Combat Team H/195,H/180,H/195 Force "B" SFCP 16,17,18 SFCP 20,21,22 1,2,3, Bns. 115th Rog. Combat Team 1,2,3, Bns 26th Rog. Combat Team 175th Reg. Combat Team (d) Fire Support Areas are shown in Ampendix 1. The KANSAS Fire Support Area is available for joint use by Forces "O" and "U". These areas will not be pro-swept and must not be used in their ontirely until so directed. It is believed that the area inshore of the ten father curve is free of mines and this portion may be used by destroyers. Swept "boat lanes" are shown in Fire Support Aroa Chart. ANNEX E TO OPERATION ORDER BB-AA GUNFIRE SUPPORT PIAN - 2 -

Annex E Gunfire Support Plan: Fire Support Group 6.

WESTERM NAVAL TASK FORCE 11thPHIB/A4-3(1)(a) ASSAULT FORCE "O" Serial: 00681 (TASK FORCE ONE TWO FOUR) U.S.S. ANCON, Flagship, TOP SECRET - NEPTURE PORTLAND, DORSET, 20 May 1944; 1200. OPERATION ORDER BE-44. (c) High performance spotting aircraft will be available between sunrise minus 40 minutes and H plus 5 hours, and to a limited extent thereafter. When conditions permit their landing, Army observation planes (Cubs) will be used in conjunction with Shore Fire Control Parties. Arrangements for air spotting are outlined in Appendix 5. (f) A British Bombardment Limison Officer will be attached to battleships and cruisers; an American Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer will be attached to each cruiser. Fire Support Groups deliver scheduled pre-landing fires and support landing force during landing and the advance inland. Protect ships and craft from shore batteries, air attack, and hostile surface vessels in the vicinity of the landing operations. (a) (b) Fire Support Groups CME and TWO. Assignment of Fire Support Areas and Sectors of Responsibility for counter-battery fire is as follows: (Fire Support Group Commanders may further subdivide counter-battery sectors.) Sector of PS Aron Initial Station Ship or Group Responsibility West boat lane, about TEXAS 12,000 yards offshore West boat lanc about GLASGOW 9400 yards offshore West boat lane, thence Destroyers, FS FS Aron THREE inshore GROUP ONE II East boat lanc about ARKANSAS 6,000 yards offshore II GEORGES IEYGUES East boat lane about 9,000 yards offshore II East boat lanc about MONTGALM 7500 yards offshore II East boat lane, thonco Destroyers, FS FS Area FOUR inshore Group TWO AUREN E TO OPERATION OFFICE BB-AA GUNFTER SUPPORT PLAN - 3 -

Annex E Gunfire Support Plan: Fire Support Group 6.

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WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE ASSAULT FORCE NO" (TASK FORCE ONE TWO FOUR) U.S.S. ANCON, Flagship, PORTLAND, DORSET, 20 May 1944; 1200.

TO OFFRATION ORDER BB-44 GUNFIRE SUPPORT FLAN

Battleships and cruisers support minesweepers by counter-battery fire as required. Destroyers proceed down boat lanes and into fire support areas maneuvering so as to maintain as heavy a volume of fire on beach targets as possible and adjusting speed so as to approach close to assault beaches as first waves beach.

Commoneing at H minus 40 minutes or as soon thereafter as visibility conditions permit, deliver counter-battery, destructive and neutralizing fires on beach defenses as laid down in Appendix 3, Schedule of Fires. After H hour deliver fires called for by assigned Shore Fire Control Parties. Except as provided in Schedule of Fires, deliver counter-battery fire after H hour normally only at targets cleared by Shore Fire Control Parties. If communications fail, or in emergencies, counter-battery and close supporting fire may be delivered at the considered discretion of the Fire Support Unit Commander when it is clearly recognized that the line of fire will not endanger own forces.

TANATSIDE and TALYBONT remain in fire support areas until H plus one hour. MELBURAK until H plus three hours. Deliver scheduled fires and counter-battery fires as directed. At the conclusion of these periods proceed out swept channel and report to Commander Area Screen. Commander Fire Support Groups CNE and TWO assign ships to counter-battery targets within their respective sectors of responsibility.

When Fire Support Areas have been suept, fire support ships maneuver in areas as necessary to deliver fires on call and minimize danger from air attack.

(c) Fire Support Group THREE

Patrol as part of area screen until required to take up gunfire tasks at which time proceed and report as follows:

Ships	Report to	Fire Support Area	Time
BALDWIN	Con FS Group TWO	FOUR	H + 180 min.
FRANKFORD	Com FS Group CNE	THREE	H ≠ 180 min.
THOMPSON	Con PS Group ONE	THREE	H / 180 min.
HARDING	Com FS Group TWO	FOUR	H / 12 hours.

Upon reporting establish communications with designated Shore Fire Control Party and deliver neutralizing and close supporting fires on call. Deliver counter-battery fires as directed.

TO OPERATION ORDER BB-AA GUNFIRE SUPPORT PIAN

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Annex E Gunfire Support Plan: Fire Support Group 6.

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WESTERN HAVAL TASK FORCE ASSAULT FORCE "O" (TASK FORCE OUR TWO FOUR) U.S.S. ANCON, Flagship, PORTLAND, DORSET, 20 May 1944; 1200.

TO OPERATION ORDER BE-AA GUNFIRE SUPPORT PLAN

(d) Fire Support Group FOUR (A1) Control Unit

Control and coordinate tasks of gunfire support craft as herein specified. Patrol in vicinity of line of departure clear of lines of fire of fire support units and assign counter-battery targets to LCG(L)s as observed. Be particularly alort to observe beach conditions and inform Force Commander and Commander Fire Support Groups CMS and TWO of needs for counter-battery and close Support Fires. Dispose LCF as considered best for protection of transport area, best lanes and beaches. Direct LCT(R) to fire relead reckets as ordered.

(42) LCG(L) Unit

Accompany LOT(A) - LOT(HE) wave in as close to beached as navigational conditions permit delivering neutralizing fire on beach defenses as specified in Appendix 3. Fire on beach defenses until leading waves actually beach except when lines of fire are fouled before that time. Remain in inshere sectors of fire support areas as follows:

Craft FS Area Counter-Battery Responsibility 100(1) 424, 426, 449 3 Sector I 1 100(1) 687, 811 4 Sector II

Prior to H hour deliver counter-battery fire as required. After H hour deliver counter-battery fire on targets specified by Commander Gunfire Support Graft. Counter-battery fire or fire on targets of opportunity is authorized in amergencies where the LGG(L) Commander clearly recognizes own troops are not within 1,000 yards of the target.

ICG(L)s will close the beach as near as possible to deliver direct armed fire on concrete pillboxes and other beach defenses.

(A3) LCT(R) Unit

Take up position in line abreast about 3,000 yards offshore of target areas specified in schedule of fires in time to deliver rocket fire when LCT(A) - LCT(HE) wave is about 300 yards offshore and fire rocket salves on assigned targets. As soon as rockets have been discharged, clear boat lanes and return to transport area.

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Annex E Gunfire Support Plan: Fire Support Group 6.

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TOP SECRET - MERTURE

WESTERN NAVAL TASK FORCE ASSAULT FORCE "O" (TASK FORCE ONE TWO FOUR) U.S.S. ANGON, Flogship, PORTLAND, DORSET, 20 May 1944; 1200.

TO OPERATION ORDER BB-44 GUNFIRE SUPPORT PLAN

LCT(R) 366, 423, 447, 450, 473 and 482 relead with HE rockets, LCT(R) 452, 464 and 483 with smoke rockets and HE rockets, by H/210 minutes. Discharge relead rockets at flanking areas when and as directed by Commander Gunfire Support Craft.

(44) LCT(A) Unit

Form wave in transport area and proceed benchward as directed in Attack Lending Plan, Annex E. Commencing at range of 3,000 yards about H minus 15 minutes, deliver counter-battery and neutralizing fire on pillboxes, fortified houses and beach defenses as set forth in Schedule of Piros. Disembark tanks, retract, and

assist in unloading as directed by Deputy Commanders of respective Assault Groups.

(45) ICK Unit

Patrol initially around transport area and beat lanes so as to provide maximum enti-aircraft protection to ships and craft. ICFs move in on flanks to protect beat lanes and beaches as directed by Commander Gunfire Support Craft.

(c) Fire Support Group FIVE.

Form wave in transport area. Leave transport area and proceed toward beach in line abroast between swept channels, following about 200 yards astern of LCT(R)s. Commence firing approximately 8,000 yards range from beach about H minus 30 minutes and deliver neutralizing fire on areas on and behind benches as provided in Schedule of Fires. Coase fire at H minus 5 minutes, turn, clear beat lanes, and return to seeward. Lend emberked artillery as directed in Attack Landing Plan.

(f) Fire Support Group SIX

Units (61) and (62) proceed as directed by Commander Assault Groups 0-1 and C-2 respectively. ICS(S) are to rendezvous with ICTs carrying DD tanks, accompany them to the launching position, and then lead DD tanks into the beach. ICS(S) not required for leading

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Annex E Gunfire Support Plan: Fire Support Group 6.